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Abstract  
De-industrialization and the rise of the service sector have formed the basis of recent 
attempts to develop a new metanarrative of economic change in twentieth-century Britain. 
Their effects have been taken as writ through labour market statistics or aggregate 
measures of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, by focussing on particular 
microeconomic spaces, a different story emerges. Using the inner areas of Liverpool as a 
case study, this article shows how the city’s social and economic problems were 
underwritten by the decline of the service sector, located around the port. By reading the 
effects of social and economic change through accounts of the physical environment, it 
demonstrates how urban decay and dereliction provided material resonance to Liverpool’s 
economic decline. The city’s landscape of urban decay and dereliction encompassed the 
infrastructure of everyday life—housing, roads, and even trees—as well as that of economic 
activity, including the docks and warehouses. Taken together, this article shows how this 
landscape of urban decay and dereliction came to be constituted as an agent within 
Liverpool’s continued economic decline in the 1970s rather than simply being a reflection 
of it. 
In June 1964, the architectural critic and journalist Ian Nairn noted that Liverpool ‘doesn’t feel 
like anywhere else in Lancashire: comparisons always end up overseas—Dublin, or Boston, or 
Hamburg’.1 Nairn’s Liverpool was confident and assertive. ‘Everyone knows about the Mersey 
Beat’, he wrote, ‘but this could not have been so successful if it had not been a symptom, drawing 
its vitality from some common resurgence'.2 In terms of the physical environment, this ‘common 
resurgence’ was best demonstrated through Graeme Shankland’s 1965 plan for the 
redevelopment of the city centre.3 By the end of the 1960s, however, this moment seems to have 
passed. From 1968, Liverpool hosted a series of government-sponsored area-based studies and 
policy initiatives which built on the legacy of the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ to identify areas of urban 
deprivation.4 The state of the physical environment was crucial in this. In December 1974 The 
Times published two articles declaring that ‘Hamburgers would not accept the standards of living 
in Liverpool’.5 The comparison between Hamburg and Liverpool was intended to highlight the 
                                                             
1 A. Jones and C. Matthews, Cities of the North: Jones the Planner (Nottingham, 2016), 208. 
2 Ibid., 207. 
3 O. Saumarez Smith, ‘Graeme Shankland: a sixties architect-planner and the political culture of the British 
left’, Architectural History 57 (2014), 393-422. 
4 R. Lowe, ‘The rediscovery of poverty and the creation of the Child Poverty Action Group, 1962-68’, 
Contemporary Record 9 (1995), 602-11; S. Todd, ‘Family welfare and social work in post-war England, c. 
1948-c.1970’, English Historical Review CXXIX (2014), 384-7; P. Shapely, Deprivation, State Interventions 
and Urban Communities in Britain, 1968-79 (London, 2017). 
5 V. Brittain, ‘Why Hamburgers would not accept the standards of living in Liverpool’, The Times (11 
December 1974), 16. 
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difficulties which each city faced, encapsulated in the repeated use of the term ‘ungovernable’. 
Nevertheless, it was apparent throughout the articles that Liverpool’s problems were worse: 
Hamburg does have slums… But on its arid sprawling acres of new housing, 
day-to-day life for the average citizen is not soured by squalor as it is in 
Liverpool. There are no broken windows, no shattered pavements, no rubbish 
in the streets, no empty acres lying desolate in the middle of the city, no ponds 
filled with rubbish in the parks, no broken escalators and lavatories in new 
shopping precincts, no three-year-old housing developments needing major 
repairs, no 22,000 people on the housing list.6 
Through the physical environment, the article’s author portrayed an image of Liverpool as a locus 
of urban decay, afflicting the everyday lives of the city’s residents. While this link between the 
social and physical environment had long been prevalent, especially in the commentaries of 
Victorian philanthropists, the case of Liverpool in the 1970s points to two important departures.7 
Firstly, Liverpool’s decaying physical environment was linked to urban decline rather than the 
effects of rapid growth. Secondly, and in contrast to other British cities—Manchester and 
Sheffield being exemplary—this decline in Liverpool was driven by the contraction of the service 
sector, located around the port, rather than the industrial sector.8 In spite of this, and somewhat 
paradoxically, Liverpool became something of an archetype of the de-industrializing city in 
Britain whilst also pointing to problems in contemporary and historical understandings of 
economic change. 
 The case of Liverpool therefore has a complicated relationship with recent 
historiographical metanarratives of economic change in twentieth-century Britain. In refuting 
long-prevalent narratives of national economic decline, recent accounts of Britain’s post-war 
economy have focused on the twin processes of de-industrialization and service sector growth.9 
As Jim Tomlinson has argued, the loss of employment in the industrial sector—that is, 
manufacturing, construction, and mining—‘has been a major force shaping post-war Britain’.10 In 
addition to contributing to long-standing concerns over Britain’s balance of payments, this 
                                                             
6 Ibid. It is not certain how clear an image the author of the article had of Hamburg itself; Brittain had 
previously published articles in The Times on a number of inner-city areas in Britain, but the piece 
comparing life in Liverpool and Hamburg appears to have been written immediately after her time in South 
Vietnam reporting on the Vietnam War. 
7 Cf. J. Donald, Imagining the Modern City (Minneapolis, MN, 1999); and G. Stedman Jones, Outcast London: 
a Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society (London, 4th edition, 2013). 
8 I. Taylor, K. Evans and P. Fraser, A Tale of Two Cities: Global Change, Local Feeling and Everyday Life in 
the North of England; a Study in Manchester and Sheffield (London, 1996). 
9 S. Broadberry, ‘The rise of the service sector’, in R. Floud, J. Humphries and P. Johnson (eds), The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. II: 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, 2014), 330-61; and 
J. Tomlinson, ‘De-industrialization not decline: a new meta-narrative for post-war British history’, 
Twentieth Century British History 27 (2016), 76-99. 
10 Ibid., 84. 
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reshaping was linked to economic welfare through rising levels of unemployment.11 But de-
industrialization in Britain did not simply involve economic and employment loss; women’s 
employment increased as the service sector, on the whole, boomed.12 The distinction between the 
industrial and service sectors was made by both contemporary policy-makers and historians 
through the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, introduced in 1948 and updated 
periodically thereafter.13 However, these economic histories have focused on national trends 
reflected in labour market statistics and other economic indicators, including Gross Domestic 
Product. By concentrating on microeconomic urban spaces, a different picture emerges through 
which we can see how particular areas did not see a straight forward process of de-
industrialization. 
This might lead us to question the validity of ‘de-industrialization’ as a metanarrative for 
economic change in late-twentieth-century Britain in favour of a more nebulous decline in manual 
employment, equally linked to social and economic welfare. Within this understanding, Liverpool 
is a critical case study, especially as the city’s economic problems were long-standing.14 The level 
of unemployment in Liverpool had been markedly high since the interwar period, as the port 
began to slowly lose its leading position within British maritime trade from the 1930s.15 Much of 
the employment which was lost as a result was ‘strongly manual, labour intensive’ male work, 
and as such bore striking similarity, in labour market terms, to that of construction workers and 
coal miners in the industrial sector.16 Within this vein, dock workers can be categorized as being 
employed in ‘manual services’, a term used by the Liverpool inner area consultants in 1977 to 
denote the quasi-industrial status of the workforce.17 Based on the industrial classification of 
members of the Liverpool chamber of commerce in the second half of the twentieth century (see 
                                                             
11 For example, see A. Cairncross, ‘What is de-industrialisation?’ in F. Blackaby (ed.), Deindustrialisation 
(London, 1978), 5-17; and Tomlinson, ‘De-industrialization not decline’, 84-5. 
12 On these trends, see S. Connolly and M. Gregory, ‘Women and work since 1970’, in N. Crafts, I. Gazeley 
and A. Newell (eds), Work and Pay in Twentieth Century Britain (Oxford, 2007), 142-77; and S. Broadberry, 
‘The rise of the service sector’, in R. Floud, J. Humphries and P. Johnson (eds), The Cambridge Economic 
History of Modern Britain, Vol. II: 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, 2014), 330-61. 
13 For example, see Central Statistical Office, Standard industrial classification (London, 1968), 34 on the 
classification of the ‘loading and unloading of vessels’ as a service within the transport and 
communication order alongside omnibus crews and post office workers. 
14 N. J. Cunningham, ‘The pattern of Merseyside employment 1949-66’ in R. Lawton and C. Cunningham 
(eds), Merseyside: social and economic studies (London, 1970), 149-201; and T. Cornfoot, ‘The economy of 
Merseyside, 1945-1982: quickening decline or post-industrial change?’ in W. Gould and A. Hodgkiss (eds), 
The resources of Merseyside (Liverpool, 1982), 14-26. 
15 C. Wildman, Urban redevelopment and modernity in Liverpool and Manchester, 1918-1939 (London, 2016), 
1. 
16 See J. Phillips, ‘Class and industrial relations in Britain: the “long” mid-century and the case of port 
transport, c. 1920-70’, Twentieth Century British History 16 (2005), pp. 55-6. 
17 H. Wilson and L. Womersley, Economic development of the inner area: report by the consultants, 
IAS/Li/21 (London, 1977), 79. 
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table 1), it was really only from the late 1970s that the effects of the decline of the service sector 
were compounded by large-scale de-industrialization in Liverpool. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
In addition to changes in the labour market, and its implications for economic welfare, de-
industrialization also led to environmental ‘ruination’.18 Understanding the physical environment 
is vital in understanding social and economic change, not least because in many British cities, the 
redevelopment of inner urban areas led to the ‘destruction’ of businesses and employment after 
the Second World War.19 The impact of this destruction extended far beyond the former sites of 
industrial employment. As Kieran Connell has shown, photographs of the Balsall Heath area of 
Birmingham in the late 1960s captured ‘the ambiguities and contradictions of navigating a 
rapidly-changing inner-city area’.20 In the case of Balsall Heath, these changes included ‘New 
Commonwealth’ immigration, anti-immigrant hostility, and urban clearance. Widespread 
concerns surrounding the effects of economic change were also reflected in the built 
environment, perhaps the best-known example of this being Margaret Thatcher’s walk through 
the ‘wilderness’ of a derelict former chemical works in Teesside in September 1987. As Jörg 
Arnold has shown, the evocative imagery of the walk in the wilderness was used by political 
opponents to satirize and criticize the effects of her government’s economic policies.21 
In these accounts, the built environment was central to people’s experience of social and 
economic change, but the walk in the wilderness is also illustrative of the important role of nature 
in identifying derelict sites. As Matthew Gandy has demonstrated in his study of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century New York City, the built environment cannot be separated from urban 
nature.22 In Liverpool, the physical environment—the human-made (built) and natural (unbuilt) 
environments—lent material resonance to the city’s economic decline from the late 1960s. But 
the physical environment was neither simply a passive backdrop or a metaphor for urban change; 
rather the physical environment was both a medium through which social and economic change 
were understood and was constituted as an active agent in the city’s continued decline. As such 
this article investigates the relationship between the ‘real’, physical environment, and the 
                                                             
18 S. High, L. MacKinnon and A. Perchard (eds), The Deindustrialized World: Confronting Ruination in 
Postindustrial Places (Vancouver, 2017), 8. 
19 A. Kefford, ‘Disruption, destruction and the creation of "the inner cities": the impact of urban renewal 
on industry, 1945-1980’, Urban History 44 (2016), 492-515. 
20 K. Connell, ‘Race, prostitution and the New Left: the postwar inner city through Janet Mendelson’s “social 
eye”’, History Workshop Journal 83 (2017), 334. 
21 J. Arnold, ‘“De-industrialization”: a research project on the societal history of economic change in Britain 
(1970-90)’, German Historical Institute London Bulletin 34 (2012), 34-6. 
22 M. Gandy, Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York City (Cambridge, MA, 2003). 
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‘imagined’, or contemporaries’ understanding of that physical environment.23 In so doing, it 
reconstructs an ‘assemblage’ or network of people, practices, and objects to investigate how these 
were linked to particular phenomena, for example urban deprivation or prostitution, as well as 
larger economic forces.24 With contemporaries viewing urban decay and dereliction as both a 
symptom of urban decline and a barrier to regeneration, the physical environment became an 
active agent within Liverpool’s urban crisis.25 The process of urban decline was therefore not 
simply conceived as a downward trajectory, but a vicious circle. 
In order to explore these interlinking processes of social, economic, and physical change, 
this article first follows the footsteps of a group of charity workers encountering inner Liverpool, 
the area immediately surrounding the city centre, for the first time in the summer of 1969. 
Through their account of the diverse assortment of urban life that became the epicentre of 
Liverpool’s ‘inner city’, it is possible to see how the physical environment gave material resonance 
to the effects of the decline of the port-based service economy at street level. By reading the 
effects of economic decline through the physical environment, we can gain new insights into 
everyday life in inner urban areas in the later twentieth century. The city’s decaying landscape, 
however, was also a medium through which the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the 1960s led to a new 
definition of ‘multiple deprivation’. Recent works on poverty in mid-to-late twentieth century 
Britain have understandably focused on material conditions within households.  However, the 
spaces between people’s homes—whether these contained vacant plots of land, crumbling 
infrastructure, or bore physical markers of crime and other social ‘problems’—were also vital in 
shaping their everyday lives. This also provides vital insight into the development of the ‘inner 
city’ as a policy problem more generally. The second part focuses on the docks themselves. As 
Liverpool’s maritime infrastructure fell out of use, it became increasingly derelict. While certain 
buildings remained in use, the docks began to be reclaimed by the natural current flows of the 
River Mersey. The spread of dereliction at this time came to be identified as a significant issue by 
local and central government, and voluntary and commercial organizations. As such, the final 
section focuses on the definition of derelict land as it was understood by these agencies. Through 
these discussions, it is possible to see how the physical environment of Liverpool came to be seen 
as more than a symbol of urban deprivation or economic decline.  In understanding the urban 
fabric as an agent within a vicious circle of decline, we can begin to understand how seemingly 
disparate processes of urban change were linked, both in contemporary conceptions of the city 
and in lived experience. 
                                                             
23 Ibid., 7. 
24 B. Latour, Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford, 2007), 1-17; 247-9. 




Urban Decay, 1968-72 
In response to the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the mid-1960s—and, from 1968, in reaction to 
Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in April of that year—successive Labour and Conservative 
governments established a series of area-based social policy initiatives and sociological studies.26 
Nearly all of these initiatives included Liverpool as a case study, cementing the city’s position as 
a locus of social investigation.27 The prevalence and persistence of urban deprivation in Liverpool 
was a crucial factor in determining the location of these initiatives within the city, but the city’s 
long-term economic troubles were also fundamental. By 1968, the city’s unemployment rate 
stood at around 3.9 per cent, compared to a national rate of 2.5 per cent. In 1972, unemployment 
in Liverpool reached 8.2 per cent; this rate continued to rise, eventually peaking at around 21 per 
cent in 1986.28 These rates of unemployment were consistently up to twice the national average. 
This disparity between national and local rates of unemployment had long been a hallmark of the 
‘regional problem’ which had emerged in the interwar period.29 What marked out the period from 
the late 1960s, however, was the increasing severity of unemployment within Liverpool as some 
areas of the city saw rates of unemployment well above 40 per cent.30 Unemployment was 
particularly marked in areas adjacent to the docks, as the number of registered dock workers fell 
in the decades after 1945 (see table 2). The decline of dock work in Liverpool points to a problem 
with metanarratives of de-industrialization in Britain as this labour formed part of the service 
sector. But the trend also had important implications for economic and social welfare which were 
evident in the physical environment. 
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
The decline in manual service sector employment in areas surrounding the docks was 
particularly acute because, as one study of the city noted: ‘new opportunities were not only in 
                                                             
26 Shapely, Deprivation, State Interventions and Urban Communities. This occurred alongside an increasing 
focus on ‘space’ as a category of analysis within academic studies more generally; see M. Foucault, ‘Of other 
spaces’, Dialectics 16 (1986), 22, as cited in S.Gunn, ‘The spatial turn: changing histories of space and place’, 
in S. Gunn and R. Morris (eds), Identities in Space: Contested Terrains in the Western City since 1850 
(Aldershot, 2001), 1-14. 
27 C. Couch, City of change and challenge: urban planning and regeneration in Liverpool (Aldershot, 2003), 
3-4. Also see S. Todd, ‘Affluence, Class and Crown Street: Reinvestigating the Post-War Working Class’, 
Contemporary British History 22 (2008), pp. 501-18. 
28 Figures taken from Employment and Productivity Gazette 76 (1968), Department of Employment Gazette 
80 (1972); and Employment Gazette 94 (1986). 
29 P. Scott, Triumph of the South: A Regional Economic History of Early Twentieth Century Britain 
(Aldershot, 2007). 
30 In some parts of the city, and among some demographic groups – particularly the city’s black 
communities – unemployment reached a rate of 46 per cent in the early 1980s; see D. Worlock and D. 
Sheppard, Better Together: Christian Partnership in a Hurt City (London, 1989), 146. 
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jobs for which [former dock workers] were not skilled, but the jobs were remote from their 
home’.31 In June 1969, the homelessness charity Shelter set up the Shelter Neighbourhood Action 
Project (SNAP) in one such area—Granby, located near the city’s south docks. SNAP described an 
‘urban crisis’ in Liverpool’s inner city stemming from the collapse of urban economies and a 
‘twilight trap’ which reduced social and physical mobility.32 The charity workers spent three 
years in Granby, managing the improvement of local housing through a General Improvement 
Area set up under the Housing Act 1969. SNAP also established a project office, the Granby Centre, 
in which project workers met with local residents to discuss housing and other issues. On their 
first night in the city, the project workers walked along Princes Avenue, Granby Street, and Upper 
Parliament Street in Liverpool 8 (see figure 1), an account of which was published in SNAP’s final 
report in September 1972.33 SNAP’s focus on housing conditions within an area typified by 
‘multiple deprivation’, joblessness, and a concentrated black and Chinese population provides an 
important account of the physical and social fabric in one area of inner Liverpool but similar 
problems were evidenced in other parts of the city.34 The concept of multiple deprivation 
emerged from post-war sociological studies in the United States, but gained increasing traction 
in Britain following the introduction of the urban programme in 1968.35 In this conception, the 
urban poor were not just materially impoverished, but suffered additional hardships including 
unemployment, precarious employment, a poor environment, a lack of access to government 
services, and a lack of political agency brought about by effective and affective distance from the 
machinery of urban governance.36 
 
 [Figure 1 here] 
                                                             
31 H. Wilson and L. Womersley, Project Report by the Consultants, IAS/Li/1 (London, 1974), 15. 
32 Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project Committee, Another chance for cities: SNAP 69/72 (London, 
1972), 11-15. 
33 SNAP, Another chance for cities, 53-5. 
34 See Tenth report with evidence taken before the Environment and Home Office Sub-Committee in Session 
1972-73, Appendices and Index: Volume II - Evidence (1972-73: House Improvement Grants), HC 349-ii 
(London, 1973), 265; and Home Affairs Select Committee, Racial disadvantage: minutes of Evidence 
(Liverpool) 14 October 1980, HC 610-x (London, 1980), 560. Also see P. Topping and G. Smith, Government 
Against Poverty? Liverpool Community Development Project, 1970-75 (Oxford, 1977) for an account of 
similar changes in Vauxhall, located to the north of Liverpool city centre. 
35 The term ‘multiple deprivation’, while then ill-defined, appeared in a 1968 Joint Circular from the Home 
Office (225/68), Department of Education and Science (19/68), Ministry of Health (35/68), Urban 
Programme (London, 1968), 1. Also see G. Norris, ‘Defining urban deprivation’, in C. Jones (ed.), Urban 
deprivation and the inner city (London, 1979), 17-31; and A. Andrews, ‘Multiple deprivation, the inner city, 
and the fracturing of the welfare state: Glasgow, 1968-78’, Twentieth Century British History (forthcoming, 
2017). 
36 It was, for example, argued that ‘THE “URBAN CRISIS” IS NOT REALLY A CRISIS OF THE MUNICIPALITY, 
BUT RATHER A CRISIS OF TECHNOLOGY and the public often feel they are governed by technocrats and 
the administrators who deploy the professionals’ (emphasis in original); see SNAP, Another chance for 
cities, 35. This sense of physical and figurative distance between the governors and the governed – ‘them 
and us’ – was also articulated in the final report of the Liverpool IAS; see H. Wilson and L. Womersley, 




As unemployment rose in Liverpool, the city exhibited a continuous process of 
depopulation which planners were unable to stem.37 By 1971, the city had already lost 28.7 per 
cent of its population from the peak in 1931.38 These twin processes of decline were reflected in 
the physical environment through urban decay: ‘despoiled and abandoned land’, failing 
infrastructure, and poor or derelict housing as well as vandalism, littering, and fly-tipping.39 
Through the close reading of the account of the walk along the boundaries of the SNAP project 
area, it is possible to see how the problems of a particular declining urban area were conceived. 
But the account also complicates our understanding of the urban crisis, showing these areas to 
be spaces of hope as much as they were spaces of distress. The SNAP workers described walking 
along Princes Avenue as ‘still a very stimulating experience even if many large houses facing the 
Avenue are now derelict and windowless’.40 Granby therefore exhibited a curious mix of 
dereliction, deprivation, and respectability. ‘Behind the imposing façade of the boulevard’, the 
streets were described as ‘bearing all the marks of blight, poverty and despair’.41  As the account 
continued: 
Roads are patched, and patched again, until recklessly uneven. But even among 
the smallest houses, especially among the smallest houses, there are polished 
knockers and often bright front doors painted in a variety of colours, more 
exciting and more successful than anything dreamed of by architects and 
planners.42 
In the streets off Princes Avenue, however, there were signs of greater problems: 
some houses become boarded up and sometimes two or three are missing and 
the spaces filled with rubble. Eventually a whole terrace has disappeared. 
Everywhere there is litter; it blows along the pavements and sometimes seems 
to fill the air.43 
                                                             
37 The aim of maintaining a significant proportion of the city’s population had been set out in City and 
County Borough of Liverpool, Development Plan: Summary of Proposals (Written Statement) (Liverpool, 
1952), 7. 
38 General Register Office, Census county reports: Lancashire (London, 1911-1961); Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys, Census county report: Lancashire (London, 1971); Office of Population Censuses 
and Surveys, Census county reports: Merseyside (London, 1981-1991). 
39 B. Robson, Those inner cities: reconciling the social and economic aims of urban policy (Oxford, 1988), 35-
7. 






The air was also filled with a ‘stink’ between the rows of houses, a result of accumulated rubbish 
and blocked drains.44 Residents’ multi-sensory experience of urban decay were therefore seen to 
compound the effects of economic decline on their social welfare. 
Urban decay also affected the natural environment of the city, as funding was no longer 
available for cultivation. The ‘great tree-lined boulevard of Princes Avenue’ remained a poignant 
symbol of the area’s past role as the home of Liverpool’s wealthy merchant class. Behind the 
boulevard, however, these trees contributed to the decay of Granby’s physical environment; 
‘unfortunately for the smaller streets, forest trees which have become too large, pushing up 
pavements, filling gutters and, in the summer, cutting out the remaining sunlight’.45 Nevertheless, 
trees also pointed to social stability within the inner city. In a leaflet précising the work 
undertaking by SNAP, a photograph taken by Nick Hedges of a woman washing her pavement 
outside her home was used to highlight the continued resilience of the area. The photograph, 
which also appeared in SNAP’s final report,46 was captioned: 
A SNAP Resident does not stop at her front door. The economic base of the 
inner city has been eroded but hope remains. Of the scores of trees planted in 
SNAP, only two have been vandalised. Can the same be said of the “New 
Jerusalems” of the architects and planners?47 
The fact that ‘only’ two trees had been vandalized were used by SNAP to convey the sense that 
Granby, in spite of its problems, remained a viable centre of urban life. 
The streets of Liverpool 8 bore the physical markers of a panoply of social problems which 
exacerbated the effects of economic decline on residents’ welfare. Towards the end of Princes 
Avenue, the group turned left, up Granby Street. Bisecting Granby ward, the SNAP committee 
described a ‘new type of cosmopolitan brilliance’, typified most pointedly by the availability of 
exotic vegetables in the shops.48 These shops, however, ‘wear heavy protective metal grilles at 
night which are rarely taken down during the day’ as a material sign of the crime encountered 
within the area.49 In Granby, this also included ‘setting fire to derelict buildings [which] is a sport 
for bored children’.50 Prostitution, drunkenness, and domestic violence were all problems 
                                                             
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 53. 
46 Ibid., 55. 
47 SNAP, The new Granby Centre & SNAP Liverpool: Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project July 1969-June 1972 
(London, 1972), 34. 
48 Ibid., 53. 
49 Ibid., 53 and 55. 
50 Ibid., 55. This had many similarities to the findings of John Barron Mays’ 1950s sociological study of 
juvenile delinquency in Liverpool which advocated a move away from purely psychological explanations of 
behaviour to focus on ‘the social setting in which the delinquency occurs and of the way in which 
environmental and personal factors interact’; see J. B. Mays, Growing Up in the City: A Study of Juvenile 
Delinquency in an Urban Neighbourhood (Liverpool, 1964), 9. 
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encountered by local police.51 It was the condition of the housing, however, which most caught 
the charity workers’ attention: 
To the north of Granby Street large houses become increasingly derelict, and 
to the east also, properties have clearly gone beyond the point of any repair. 
One reaches the condemned areas where the worst off families are housed in 
avenues with noble names: “Upper Parliament Street”.52 
On Upper Parliament Street, ‘people are just “holding on”’. Once more, this was evidenced through 
the physical environment, with the SNAP workers describing 
net curtains pulled together with safety pins, children hanging around the 
steps or playing in the rubble. Some houses are without water and sanitation 
and, as night falls, a single electric bulb can light up many scenes of miserably 
furnished bedsits.53 
From these descriptions, it is apparent that the physical environment encountered by the SNAP 
workers was showing signs of significant physical and social decay. This social decay was 
reflected in moral concerns with prostitution and crime, as much as it was in concern over the 
poor living conditions experienced by the area’s residents.54 This evocative account of Liverpool 
8 therefore shows us how agencies charged with intervening in particular neighbourhoods 
understood the lived experiences of local residents through the physical environment. 
Nevertheless, while the built environment underwrote SNAP’s understanding of social 
change in Granby from 1969 to 1972, there were other agents, including non-human animals, 
which highlighted the decay of the area.55 Dogs were used to ‘defy intruders, scraping and barking 
behind rotten back doors’.56 SNAP’s headquarters was to be based in a derelict police station in 
Granby. When the workers arrived in 1969, a ‘wild’ dog had been shut in the building by a 
contractor, ‘a familiar technique since empty buildings are quickly stripped of lead and copper’.57 
However, one method used by ‘culprits’ was to smash the windows, thereby allowing the animal 
to escape and enabling themselves to ‘strip’ the building of its metals. In the meantime, the police 
                                                             
51 Police encounters were fraught, on both sides, in part reflecting poor relations between the local multi-
ethnic population and the authorities. As such, when the ‘nice young copper’ had ‘identified his enemy’, it 
was, in his words, ‘some half-castes [who] were on a rampage’; ibid. 
52 Ibid.; for several nights in July 1981, Upper Parliament Street was the locus of significant urban disorder, 
known as the Toxteth ‘riots’. 
53 Ibid. 
54 On residents’ concerns over the ‘effect of vice on innocent by-standers’, see SNAP, Another chance for 
cities, 101. 
55 See C. Pearson, ‘Dogs, history, and agency’, History and Theory 52 (2013), 128-45; and S. McFarland and 
R. Hediger, ‘Approaching the agency of other animals: an introduction’ in S. McFarland and R. Hediger (eds), 
Animals and agency: an interdisciplinary exploration (Leiden, 2009), 1-22. 
56 SNAP, Another chance for cities, 53. 
57 Ibid., 53. 
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were preoccupied with ‘the added problem of catching or destroying a dangerous dog’.58 While 
their presence was contingent on the actions of people within Granby, these dogs nevertheless 
formed an important part of the urban environment through the attempt to guard against petty 
crime thought to be engendered through dereliction and urban decay. 
SNAP’s narrative of everyday life in a neighbourhood, typified by moral and physical 
decay, was complicated by evidence of resilience.  The acts of washing the pavement and of not 
vandalising trees, along with the brightly-painted front doors and recently-polished door 
knockers, provided a counter to the decay and despair emblemized by crooked pavements, wild 
dogs, and ‘miserably furnished bedsits’. Added to this was a juxtaposition between night and day: 
Our first walk through the area ended as service workers were already on their 
way to the bus stops. One night’s siege was over and it was impossible to avoid 
a feeling of relief similar to the arrival of daylight on 14th Street, Washington 
D.C. or in South Bronx.59 
This ‘feeling of relief’ following the ‘siege’ was again shown through the assemblage of people, 
objects, and acts which together comprised urban society in inner Liverpool. This included the 
‘owner of a large house in Ducie Street [who] was painting his wooden fencing post-office red and 
canary yellow’, door knobs being polished, a Wendy House being erected for local children, and 
that same woman, who evidently captured the attention of the charity workers, ‘working her way 
with bucket and scrubbing brush across the pavement outside her house.’60 It is unclear whether 
the events described above genuinely took place over the course of one evening, or whether the 
project workers’ account was itself an accumulation of encounters, memories, and impressions. 
To an extent, however, this is less important than the insight the account provides into social 
change in inner Liverpool. By following the steps of these charity workers along the streets of 
Granby, it becomes clear that agencies charged with intervening in Liverpool’s burgeoning ‘urban 
crisis’ understood the effects of economic decline, especially those linked to the welfare of 
residents, through the physical environment.  
Dereliction and the Docks, 1972-75 
Liverpool’s docks were at the centre of its service-based economy, as well as the economic life of 
surrounding neighbourhoods. However, in the post-war decades, macroeconomic and 
technological changes began to undermine their economic role, leading to their closure. From 
1956, the standardized shipping container revitalized the global economy, reshaping ports and 
                                                             
58 Ibid., 55. 




port cities across the world.61 In Liverpool, shipping activity had long been based around a 
network of docks stretching along the Mersey waterfront, from Brunswick, located south of the 
city centre, to Vauxhall in the north. This network of docks extended into Bootle, a town 
connected to, but administratively separate from, Liverpool. From the late 1960s, the 
construction of Seaforth Docks near Bootle, to the north of Liverpool, shifted the locus of maritime 
trade, as the city’s nineteenth-century port infrastructure and shallow waters were inaccessible 
to newer and larger container ships.62 The changing fortunes of Liverpool’s port in the later 
twentieth century, partly as a result of containerization and partly through changes in the flow of 
international maritime trade, therefore provide an important lens through which changes in the 
city’s economy and labour market can be understood. This was especially the case for the 
communities living and working along Liverpool’s waterfront.63 Reflecting on this shift in the 
1960s and 1970s, Marc Levinson has argued, 
The armies of ill-paid and ill-treated workers who once made their livings 
loading and unloading ships in every port are no more, their tight-knit 
waterfront communities now just memories. Cities that had been centers of 
maritime commerce for centuries, such as New York and Liverpool, saw their 
waterfronts decline with startling speed, unsuited to the container trade or 
simply unneeded.64 
The effects of this change were also wrought through the physical environment. In addition to the 
decaying effects of urban change on housing areas discussed above, the decline of the port was 
sharply felt through the increasing dereliction of the docks and maritime infrastructure. 
With a move to containerization, the city’s South Docks were increasingly regarded as 
obsolete. Setting out the rationale for their closure, the Chairman of the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board, J. G. Cuckney, said at a meeting on 26 April 1971 that ‘Assets and resources must 
earn their keep or be eliminated. In the situation in which we find ourselves there is simply no 
alternative to such a policy’.65 Discussions on the closure of the docks involved members of 
Liverpool Corporation with the aim of redeveloping the site. Nevertheless, at the first annual 
meeting of the newly-established Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC) the following 
                                                             
61 M. Levinson, The box: how the shipping container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger 
(Oxford, 2nd ed., 2016); on Liverpool, see 270-79. 
62 The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MDHB) proposed the construction of the Seaforth Dock to the 
National Ports Council in 1965. This was approved in 1966 through the passing of the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Act 1966; the new dock opened in 1971. See MDHB, Annual report and review for the year ended 
1st July, 1965 (Liverpool, 1965), 6. 
63 L. Balderstone, G. Milne and R. Mulhearn, ‘Memory and place on the Liverpool waterfront in the mid-
twentieth century’, Urban History 41 (2014), 478-96. 
64 Levinson, The box, 2. 
65 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, Annual report and accounts for the year ended 31st December 1970 
(Liverpool, 1971), n.p. 
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year, Cuckney acknowledged that ‘Having regard to the present state of the market for land on 
Merseyside… the profitable redevelopment or disposal of this site will probably be achieved only 
in the long term’.66 The South Docks were finally closed in September 1972, as trade relocated to 
the north of the city.67 The sale of the docks was a vital aim for the MDHC which intended to use 
the proceeds from selling the Albert Dock to support the repayment of an unsecured loan taken 
out in 1973.68 In fact, this repayment plan had been ordered by the High Court in 1974.69 Progress 
on the sale was slow, attributed to the ‘worsened’ economic climate and a central government tax 
on property developers.70 Problems persisted, with the ‘depressed’ property market accounting 
for the low sales of MDHC land in 1975 which provided only £33,250 for the company’s coffers. 
During the 1970s, there were a number of proposals to redevelop and reuse the South Docks. For 
example, plans for the sale of the Albert Dock to the city council, under discussion in 1974 and 
1975, would have provided additional accommodation for Liverpool Polytechnic and, it was 
hoped, raise £2 million for the company.71 There was also the possibility that the neighbouring 
Canning Dock could be sold ‘for a Government Office scheme’.72 
These sales never came to fruition.73 Increased taxes and continued economic problems 
were seen to have inhibited the company’s ability to sell off surplus land, and in 1977 it was only 
able to raise £3,000 through the sale of a single property in the South Docks.74 Moreover, the 
Community Land Act 1975 was claimed to have significantly reduced the value of the MDHC’s 
surplus land, falling by £4,282,000 in real terms between 1971 and 1974.75 The buildings owned 
by the MDHC in its South Docks system were not derelict in the 1970s, with small business units 
and storage spaces available for rent.76 This continued use therefore partially explained the 
decision not to sell the docks ‘until the funds are available for re-development’ after plans were 
mooted in 1976 for the area to be given ‘“New Town” status’.77 Nevertheless, a depressed market 
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meant that the land which was to be used to pay off the company’s debt became something of a 
burden, at least on the MDHC’s balance sheet. 
While the buildings remained in use, the South Docks were not immune to dereliction. 
Following the closure of the docks, the berthing infrastructure, and the river water itself, became 
the locus for concerns surrounding environmental decline and dereliction. The opening of the 
South Dock gates meant that the water level was tidal, and with no maintenance, silt which had 
been ‘contaminated’ by sewage was allowed to flow in and settle.78 As shown through the later 
writings of Peter Walker, Secretary of State for the Environment from October 1970 to November 
1972, and his eventual successor, Michael Heseltine, the environmental conditions of urban rivers 
were seen to constitute a significant problem in terms of social welfare and economic 
performance.79 Linking the dereliction of the docks to the conditions of urban communities in the 
Toxteth area of Liverpool, Heseltine recalled a stark image of the docks and river: 
Add to the mounds of waste the rotting warehouses of a port industry 
apparently in terminal decline, the great architectural triumph of the Albert 
Docks an empty ruin then threatened with demolition, and you get a feel of 
Liverpool’s prospects at that time – as bleak as a winter’s day.80 
From this brief account of environmental dereliction on the River Mersey, we can see how the 
decline of the port affected the infrastructure of economic activity. This dereliction, however, was 
not simply about buildings falling out of use, but the reclamation of physical infrastructure by 
nature. Through the docks, we can see how this kind of dereliction came to be constituted as a 
problem as the condition of urban waterways was subsumed within a larger landscape of urban 
decay and disused land. This larger landscape included sites across the city which were 
increasingly seen as an active impediment to Liverpool’s economic regeneration. 
Dereliction and Vacant Land, 1976-77 
While Liverpool had substantial areas of disused land, these sites did not conform to the definition 
of ‘derelict land’ as set out in the Local Employment Acts of 1960 and 1972. Conceived within a 
regional policy framework, central government defined dereliction as land that was ‘derelict, 
neglected or unsightly, and likely to remain so for a considerable period’.81 This circular definition 
prioritized economic issues through a focus on de-industrialized spaces and prospective 
                                                             
78 This issue will be discussed in more detail below; see Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC), 
Initial development strategy (Liverpool, 1981), 5. 
79 See P. Walker, The ascent of Britain (London, 1977), 124-5; and M. Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: my 
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80 Heseltine, Life in the Jungle, 211. 
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employment opportunities. Development Districts were therefore provided financial assistance 
for the clearance of derelict sites with the ‘necessary condition that clearance of the dereliction 
in question would promote employment within the area’.82 This was reflected in the concern that 
‘The ugliness caused by widespread dereliction is a deterrent to incoming industry, which it must 
continue to be our aim to attract to these places’.83 Within this framework, dereliction in the North 
West of England was seen to affect ‘the old colliery areas where pit heaps have been 
supplemented by the wastes from chemical and other plant’.84 These post-industrial landmarks 
were not a feature of Liverpool’s landscape, and so a 1967 survey of derelict land conducted by 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government listed the total acreage of derelict land in the city 
as ‘NIL’.85 While categories of dereliction were therefore geared toward the fallout of de-
industrialization, the decline of Liverpool’s port also contributed to the spread of vacant and 
derelict land in Liverpool. Central government’s somewhat narrow and tautological definition of 
dereliction therefore pointed towards an important tension between national policy and the 
material realities of the urban physical environment. 
Through a series of reports published in 1976 and 1977, the local authority, planning 
consultants, and voluntary organizations identified the scale of disused land in Liverpool and 
developed policies through which these sites could be brought back into productive use. These 
included the inner area district statements (IADS), a series of planning documents produced by 
the City Planning Officer, E. S. P. Evans, in December 1976 and approved by Liverpool City Council 
in April 1977.86 The IADS identified the extent of Liverpool’s ‘land resource’, defined as the area 
of land and buildings as ‘currently vacant’; land that was ‘interim treated’ but required further 
investment; and land or buildings which were ‘likely to become vacant in the next 5-7 years’.87 
The statements’ focus on the inner areas covered the majority of Liverpool’s housing built prior 
to the First World War, much of which had been scheduled for clearance or improvement.88 As 
the statements made clear, the land resource was integral to the ‘overall strategy needed for 
tackling the problems of the inner areas’.89 These problems were multifarious, but Evans claimed 
that ‘The importance of utilising the land resource… is self-evident by its scale and the aura of 
                                                             
82 The National Archives, London (TNA): EW 7/292, W. Guy, Note on dereliction, 11 May 1965. 
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89 Ibid., 2. 
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dereliction and decline which it presents’.90 Within this vein, Evans stated that the geographical 
extent of vacant and derelict land was such that 
not only does it detract from the physical appearance of the inner areas, but it 
is a positive deterrent to attracting private investment and retaining a 
“balanced” population structure.91 
As we can see from Evans’ assertion, the geographical spread of dereliction across Liverpool, but 
particularly within the inner areas of the city, constituted a problem from both a social and an 
economic standpoint as the physical environment was conceived as a barrier to the inward flow 
of people and private sector investment which the city needed. 
The IADS were followed, in September 1977, by the publication of the final reports of the 
three inner area studies (IAS). Liverpool’s IAS consultants—Hugh Wilson and Lewis Womersley 
along with the architectural and planning firms Roger Tym and Associates and Jamieson Mackay 
and Partners—spent five years studying different aspects affecting life in the ‘inner city’. Along 
with the findings of the Birmingham and Lambeth studies, their reports represented a rejection 
of urban modernist approaches to the built environment through their criticism of the effects of 
planning, and other processes of urban change, on the inner areas.92 While the critique of planning 
practices was vital in this shift in policy towards the physical environment of inner urban areas, 
the link between the amenity of the urban redevelopment and economic regeneration was key. 
While Liverpool’s was not the most concentrated area of disused land—the East End of 
Glasgow comprised 20 per cent derelict land—the scale was still important.93 The IADS has cited 
a figure of 457.1 hectares (1143 acres or 4.571 km2)—or approximately 15 per cent of the total 
area—of disused land in Liverpool.94 In Liverpool, the IAS consultants utilized land use surveys 
published in March 1975 and October 1976 as the basis for their conclusions, citing figures of 56 
hectares of vacant land within the project area covered by the IAS (approximately 11 per cent of 
the total) and 500 hectares across the city as a whole.95 While Liverpool’s acres of vacant land 
were attributed to a number of causes, including the ‘social development programmes of the last 
twenty years’, primarily slum clearance and the slow pace of redevelopment which followed 
rather than the remnants of Second World War bomb damage, the problem of disused land and 
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buildings was conceived within the broader social and economic needs of the city.96 The impact 
of this widespread dereliction on inner Liverpool was therefore said to be ‘incalculable’, as the 
land 
attracts vandalism and contributes to an atmosphere of obsolescence, 
dilapidation and decay. It is not only that people living nearby have their home 
environment blighted, but that attempts at regeneration through attracting 
private investment are stultified whether it be in housing or jobs; and little 
private investment is likely to come to the inner areas of its own volition.97 
Through the analysis of case studies, focused on individual sites located around clusters of vacant 
buildings, the consultants concluded that any progress in redeveloping the land would be slow.98 
As the consultants claimed, the ‘environmental damage’ brought through disused land ‘gives the 
surrounding area an air (and often smell) of depression which could not but discourage activity 
and enterprise on other, adjacent land’.99 This sensory barrage, attributed to derelict land, was 
one means through which these sites were seen to discourage investment; as the consultants 
continued: 
it implies a significant loss of people, activities, purchasing power that once 
both supported and depended upon the remaining area. That subtle economic 
interdependability has been disrupted, and the effects manifest themselves in 
areas not so far directly affected by [clearance] schemes.100 
Vacant land, therefore, was seen to have a negative impact on areas which had not been cleared 
by planners.101 What is more, this was seen as a waste of resources; communities suffered ‘by 
being deprived of houses or industry or open space’ and lost ‘“productive” public spending’ on 
maintaining vacant land on top of losing land value in their area.102 
In identifying the geographical extent of disused land in Liverpool, planners and planning 
consultants had acknowledged a widespread problem. But disused land was also conceived as a 
‘resource’. This land resource therefore represented more than a problem to be dealt with: it also 
signified a partial solution. With some 60 per cent of the land resource owned by the city council, 
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‘every vacant and potentially vacant site’ was assigned to a particular department or agency 
depending on its allotted future use.103 The IADS, however, were not simple planning documents 
setting out the city council’s policies regarding land use. While Liverpool had an abundance of 
land, it was lacking in financial resources. The statements formed part of a concerted attempt to 
leverage greater investment from central government, with Evans describing the report as 
‘advocacy material’.104 Vacant land, therefore, represented a significant issue for Liverpool; the 
land itself was seen to offer a way out of these problems, even if some of it was beyond repair. But 
land alone could not achieve this and as such, in conceiving dereliction as a resource, the IADS 
were an attempt to turn a problem into a solution. 
While local authority planners sought to leverage the land resource to gain additional 
financial support from central government, voluntary organizations responded with proposals to 
use disused sites for the provision of community and social services. In May 1977, the Liverpool 
Council of Voluntary Service (LCVS), which brought together and advocated for many of the city’s 
locally-based voluntary organizations, responded to the IADS through its committee on urban 
poverty, known as ‘Enterprise Merseyside’. Enterprise Merseyside proposed that a land bank be 
established, overseen by an interdepartmental unit of Liverpool City Council, rather than having 
vacant land apportioned to different departments based on its intended use. Officers from a 
number of departments would be seconded to this unit which would be based within the City 
Solicitor’s Department. This, it was argued, would allow for a more consistent approach to 
dereliction.105 A number of future land uses were set out, including housing, amenities, and 
enterprise, i.e. small businesses. The scale of the problem, however, meant that these uses could 
not be achieved immediately. In its so-called ‘ginger paper’—owing to the colour of the paper on 
which it was printed—Enterprise Merseyside argued that 
Inner city decline could be partially offset by encouraging residents and 
possible employers to utilise vacant land and buildings for community facilities 
and by the sheltering of embryonic business initiatives, at little or no extra cost 
to the City Council.106 
Enterprise Merseyside thus proposed that voluntary organizations could occupy properties for a 
rent-free tenancy period of up to two years, thereby ensuring the buildings’ continued usage and 
maintenance as well as providing space for ‘a wide range of social welfare and community 
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facilities’.107 This proposal would, it was argued, achieve the dual aims of stemming dereliction 
and providing amenities for voluntary and community groups. Through these land use policies, 
the voluntary group therefore identified a way to balance Liverpool’s financial constraints with 
its abundance of disused sites. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The reports produced by these voluntary organizations—along with those published by 
planners and policy consultants—provide an evocative image of Liverpool’s physical 
environment in the 1970s. Enterprise Merseyside published a cartoon on the cover of their ginger 
paper satirising the ‘empty offices’, ‘wasteland’, ‘disused docks’, and ‘demolition’ which greeted 
visitors on their arrival in Liverpool, a place in which redevelopment was ‘prohibited for 20 
miles’. Similarly, a group of voluntary organizations, in responding to the final report of the 
Liverpool IAS, described ‘a form of environmental anarchy’ and ridiculed the notion that people 
still wished to live in the ‘brick strewn, massacred wastelands open to the Mersey winds’.108 But 
dereliction in Liverpool was more than an image problem. The city’s widespread derelict sites 
were a result of Liverpool’s long-term economic decline throughout the twentieth century. What 
is more, the geographical extent of these sites, which spanned much of the city but were 
particularly concentrated in the inner areas, provided material resonance to Liverpool’s decline 
through their impact on residents’ welfare. Given the scale of these problems, Enterprise 
Merseyside argued that ‘Derelict sites on the Wirral should not be a priority [in central 
government policy] when central Liverpool is blighted by vacant areas’.109 The reason for this was 
simple, and highlighted the true importance of dereliction in late twentieth-century British cities: 
‘the conspicuous areas of vacant land seem the most pressing of such problems which the City 
needs to solve if Liverpool is not to continue down the spiral of decline’.110 
The reports and responses produced around 1977 pointed towards an important tension 
in approaches to the physical environment. Derelict land was constituted as a problem. It blighted 
the urban landscape and impeded economic investment. Vacant land, on the other hand, was seen 
as a resource which could be used to bring investment into the city. It was the same land, but 
contemporaries attached different meaning to it depending on a number of factors, including 
environmental amenity and associations made with other social and economic problems within 
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the area. Nevertheless, in opening up the definition of dereliction, which had previously been 
restricted by government legislation to post-industrial environments, these planning and policy 
papers highlighted the ruinous effects of service sector decline – the docks, but also the industries 
which were supported by the port – on the physical and social environments of urban spaces. 
Conclusion 
Across much of the western world in the 1970s, there seemed to be a pervasive sense of ‘urban 
crisis’. In the United States, the crisis was linked to the collapse of heavy industries in the north-
west, racial inequality, and the periodic breakdown of law and order.111 In West Germany, urban 
leaders identified physical decay, sprawl, and rising inequality as key markers of its urban 
crisis.112 In Britain, the crisis stemmed from the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the mid-1960s, de-
industrialization and the decline of manual services, and the apparent inability of policy-makers 
to successfully ameliorate the effects of these changes. Within these conceptions of the urban 
crisis, the physical environment of cities was critical in diagnosing the problem and prescribing 
remedies. By reading the effects of economic decline through the physical environment, we can 
therefore gain new insights into how particular urban agencies understood everyday life in urban 
areas in the later twentieth century. This shaped their responses to economic decline, as urban 
decay and dereliction in these areas gave material resonance to contemporary concerns 
surrounding a multitude of issues.  
As this article has shown, Liverpool became an archetype of urban decline in Britain 
during the 1970s as its inner areas became the focus of significant investigation by local and 
national government and voluntary organizations. Evidence of the effects of economic decline in 
particular fed into contemporary understandings of de-industrialization. In spite of this, the city 
did not see a straight forward process of de-industrialization. The case of Liverpool therefore 
highlights the importance of the labour market, and manual labour in particular, in understanding 
urban economic change rather than an understanding of de-industrialization based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification system. Perhaps more significant, however, was the role of the 
physical environment in shaping the conceptions of agencies tasked with intervening in the urban 
crisis. Areas of high unemployment were conceived as areas of physical and social decay. As sites 
of economic activity closed, they bore markers of dereliction, including being taken over by 
nature. The growing body of evidence of the effects of economic decline on the physical 
environment—and the link which was drawn between this and the everyday lives of urban 
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residents—contributed to a shift in the definition of dereliction. This shift also reflected a growing 
concern that widespread urban decay and dereliction, including vacant and unused land, was 
becoming an active impediment to economic regeneration. The physical environment was 
therefore more than a symbol of urban deprivation or economic decline; it was conceived as an 
active agent. 
This became all the more important in the early 1980s. Following the outbreak of urban 
disorder in Liverpool 8, known as the Toxteth ‘riots’, in July 1981, there were two competing 
policies advanced by senior members of Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet.113 Michael Heseltine, 
Secretary of State for the Environment, put forward a series of political reforms and 
environmental and economic regeneration policies as part of a ‘substantial commitment… to 
Merseyside and other hard-pressed conurbations’.114  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey 
Howe, suggested that an alternative policy, surreptitiously labelled ‘managed decline’, by which 
inner-city areas would be ‘stabilise[d]’, followed by a ‘sustained effort to absorb Liverpool 
manpower elsewhere’.115 Heseltine’s approach ultimately won out and the projects which he 
oversaw as ‘Minister for Merseyside’, especially the regeneration of the Albert Docks, emphasized 
the physical regeneration of the docks and surrounding areas as a starting point for the city’s 
economic renewal. Policies developed in Liverpool—including the trial of Urban Development 
Corporations and Enterprise Zones—formed the basis of urban regeneration projects elsewhere. 
From this, we can see how the physical environment was continually understood as an active 
agent within a vicious circle of economic decline which, it was believed, could only be reversed 
through the (albeit selective) treatment of dereliction and urban decay. 
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1950 2,277 25 70 4 1 
1960 1,989 30 61 8 1 
1970 1,915 36 56 2 6 
1980 1,919 32 62 6 0 
1993 1,046 10 85 5 0 
Source: Robert Bennett, ‘Chambers of Commerce Historical Census and Benchmarking Data, 1790-2005,’ 
UK Data Service, data collection SN 6878, 2011, 
<https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=6878> [accessed 25 March 2015]. 
 
Table 2: Number of registered dock workers, 1947-89 
 National register Liverpool 
1947 79,769 - 
1957 75,500 16,085 
1967 56,808 11,530 
1969 49,225 11,100 
1971 43,645 10,427 
1973 34,590 7,550 
1975 31,884 7,326 
1977 29,168 6,402 
1979 25,770 5,202 
1981 18,219 3,402 
1983 13,813 2,151 
1985 11,922 1,862 
1989 9,400 1,100 
Source: Bill Hunter, They knew why they fought (London, 1994), 135 as cited in Brian Marren, We shall not 
be moved: how Liverpool’s working class fought redundancies, closures and cuts in the age of Thatcher  






Figure 1: Map of the Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project area (shaded grey) and the route taken 
by project workers on their first night (dashed line) 
 
© Crown Copyright and Landmark Information Group Limited (2018). All rights reserved. (1960s). 
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Figure 2: Cartoon satirising the problem of dereliction in Liverpool, 1977 
 
Source: Liverpool Council of Voluntary Service, Vacant land: an Enterprise Merseyside ginger paper 
(Liverpool, 1977). 
